Task & Purpose: America’s New 40 ton Bradley M2A4E1

[Damraska]

This is frustrating. I am not asking for a current analysis of a war with China. I am pointing out that opponents like the Chinese are actively developing ways to overcome weapon systems like this one. Based on events in Ukraine, such development appears to have a trajectory.

Assuming both adversaries have equal budgets, what happens when each and every $3,000,000 (or whatever) Bradley needs to face down 30 anti-tank drones/missiles costing $100,000 (or whatever)? If a Bradley can kill 70% of incoming drones/missiles, 4 or 5 will do the job. Thirty is complete overkill. Paring down to 6 per Bradley, that is $3,000,000 versus $600,000, leaving $2,400,000 per Bradley to invest elsewhere.

A Bradley capable of shooting down 99.9% of incoming drones/missiles would completely change this equation.

Yes, I build little plastic tanks. In the process of doing that, I look at a lot of service manuals and read a lot of history books. Patterns emerge. I am curious about the thought processes that lead to the development of weapons. Maybe, some day, I will build a model of this Bradley.

It’s fine. I’ll buy some books.

[Trisaw]

The US Army is usually in transition. Once something is fielded, it often looks for the next-generation replacement. Long lead, design, and production times dictate this (and also to keep the employees working and thinking).

Thus, the M2A4E1 is a transition to the Optionally-manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV), the Bradley’s replacement. Uncrewed OMFV may be; however, the OMFV and the Bradley are supposed to transport six infantrymen into battle. The cost to destroy one may be cheap, but these IFVs still need to transport infantrymen.

“Iron Curtain,” where the ATGM detonates against a wall of electricity didn’t work as expected. Active Armor, where the plate flies into the projecticle is dangerous and still years away as it can lead to escorting infantry injuries and death.

The 25mm on the Bradley has no airbursting options against aerial drones. The 30mm or 50mm on the OMFV will.

[Uncle-Heavy]

A hammer is useless against mosquitoes
A fly-swatter is useless for driving nails into wood
Trying to make a tool that does both results in a tool that is bad at both jobs.

An airforce can protect against airborne threats but it is pretty useless against
very small, rather slow and near invisible targets close to the ground.
The whole drone warfare development prompted by Putins idiotic war will change
many ways of thinking. Going small is probably not the correct solution, ask the Russians
who get hunted down by small drones. Drones against drones? Maybe, AI improvements to let the hunter drones identify targets and make decisions. Will drones be equipped with IFF systems to prevent “friendly” attacks?
Heavy gauge shotguns to allow soldiers to blast drones out of the sky?

I saw a video recently of a Ukrainian drone carrying a stick, bog standard wooden stick found in the forest, which flew in over a Russian drone so that the stick broke one propeller of the Russian drone. Design a magazine that can hold maybe a dozen thin carbon fibre sticks. Deploy two at the time and fly in over enemy drone. No point in carrying lots of sticks since the batteries will run out before all sticks have been used.
A single stick will probably be good for a couple of engagements.
Large winged and propeller driven drones could be attacked with small nylon nets (table cloth sized) dragged into their propellers. Ukraine uses FPV drones to crash explosive charges into the topside or wings of larger Russian drones.

[Trisaw]

Possible next-generation AFV sUAS defense.

Laser Dazzlers For Defending Tanks Against Marauding Drones Are An Untapped...

[Armor_Buff]

@Damraska Doug,

Based on what I’ve read or saw on TV from the last ~75 years of US Army doctrine, offensive operations on the ground wait until air superiority is established. If the energy has fighters, the Air Force wins air superiority then pounds the ground.

In that very specific 30 drones vs one Bradley scenario, the Bradley’s probably gets knocked out. All the other stuff previously mentioned is done beforehand to reduce the number of times a scenario 30 vs 1 or similar occurs.

The Drone Swarm

speculation & conjecture based information from YouTube

Based on Ukraine War, its implied Electronic Warfare Jamming makes 50 to 85 percent of drones ineffective depending on the drone type.

a) 30 drones might be more like 10 drones as effective threats.

b) 10 drones with roughly 80 percent accuracy that becomes 8 munitions to stop.

c) In unfavorable conditions (city streets) the Bradley point defense system rated 70 percent. Out of the city its probably much higher like 90 to 95 percent effective. 8 munitions become 4 munitions.

d) 4 drone munions hit our Bradley with a random pattern. Reactive armor, dud rate & hitting some of the jungle of stuff on top of the turret probably average absorption of two munions.

e) Bradley eats two warheads. That’s going to knock out the Bradley but it isn’t necessarily going to turn it into a burned out total loss wreck because the vehicle has a very advanced fire suppression system. The Bradley also has spall liner to limit internal damage.

f) Damage & Knock Out. For conjecture purposes, I’ll assume the Bradley had three zones.

Driver & Engine
Turret
Infantry Compartment

With two hits, two areas are probably getting seriously damaged. There’s a small possibility both hits, hit the same area.

The vehicle is probably going to be out of the fight and in the repair shop for a good bit. It might be totally destroyed but based on 64% survival in Ukraine for a year without the point defense system and without the more advanced fire suppression system, I’d guess the first time around the damaged Bradley AFV surived, gets repaired and fights another day.

However, it’s combined arms per US doctrine so we’re also developing other defensive measures for deal with drones.

Here’s one example a Sea-Wizz on flat bed…

They’ll almost certainly be others in the works.

Just my thoughts & opinion.

[Uncle-Heavy]

@Armor_Buff

Electronic Warfare Jamming makes 50 to 85 percent of drones ineffective depending on the drone type.

Taking out a remote control link is relatively easy,
disrupting the AI algorithm doing target recognition inside the drone
could be more difficult.
I think AI controlled hunter-killer drones will appear in a few years time, sort of a local combat air patrol. Radar tech to detect very small targets in the local area to trigger the release of hunter-killer drones.

[Trisaw]

The 20mm Phalanx CIWS on a HEMTT is just a prototype as all CIWSs are on lowboy trailers and aren’t that mobile.

[srmalloy]

@Trisaw

as all CIWSs are on lowboy trailers and aren’t that mobile.

In this video, at 0:24 in, there is a brief shot of the LBPWS (‘Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System’) on its trailer; what appears to be a PowerPoint presentation from the 42nd Annual Gun & Missiles Symposium & Exhibition, about halfway down the presentation, presents more details about what the components on the trailer are. Not really enough detail to use as a modeling reference, though.

[Trisaw]

Hopefully the new M2A4E1 has cameras on the hull to allow the crew and infantry inside to “See through” the armor using TV screens or IVAS goggle helmets to increase situational awareness to the environment and threats outside.

The gunner has the Primary Sight and the TC has the CITV, but with hull cameras or linking to the Primary Sight and CITV, the riding infantry can at least see some form of external video or image.