March 1-15 DoD Announcements Analysis
Many people cite lessons learned in Ukraine to justify major changes to US doctrine, but it’s worth noting that the war we were supposedly learning so much from is a war in which neither side is winning and both sides suffer massive casualties. Is that how we want our next conflict to go? Drone warfare is supposedly the next great thing, but EW and C-UAS systems force the price of drones to rise and rise. At which point does the means, drones required to destroy a single armored vehicle, justify the end, destroying said vehicle? The drone age is not going to last, and it’s important to not dig ourselves into a position that we cannot practically climb out of.
What We Know
On April 30th, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth published a memo dictating a reduction of “excess ground vehicles”. Now this memo on its own didn’t actually provide much clarity as to what that meant, aside from mentioning Humvees and the MQ-1C as examples for what might be on the chopping block, but on March 1st we got a release from the Secretary of the Army, Dan Driscol. He clarified that the Army would “cancel procurement” of “excess ground vehicles like the HMMWV and JLTV”. He also announced that procurement of the AH-64D would be stopped, all of this supposedly in favor of integrating “long range missiles and modernized UAS into formations” in addition to plans to “field the M1E3 tank, develop the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft, and close the C-sUAS capability gap”. As of the writing of this article we have no word regarding the specific extent of which this covers. This might or might not mean that existing contracts for JLTV, which the US has backlogs of that stretch all the way into 2027, will be canceled. It could also mean that once these contracts are completed, the DoD will no longer be procuring systems.
So in regards to those areas, it seems pretty clear that the DoD wants to cut things that might not make sense to keep procuring. Attack helicopters as a whole have faced constant criticism due to vulnerabilities in the deep strike role, primarily because of light plentiful MANPADS (Man-Portable-Air-Defense-Systems). In the war on terror, the US was forced to rethink its approach to attack helicopters. Instead of using them in the deep strike and reconnaissance roles, they “conducted effective armed reconnaissance and close shaping missions”, which is to say instead of putting themselves at extreme risk, they ended up giving a lot more direct on station support to grunts. The war in Ukraine has changed things. Early war statistics suggested that Russia may have lost as much as a fourth of its entire fleet of KA-52 attack helicopters, however evolving tactics have allowed them to still be somewhat effective on the battlefield. One idea for attack helicopters was to use them as platforms to launch drones, and act as a central hub for them. What it comes down to though, is that the age of the attack helo may have passed.
Moving on to the humvee and JLTV, these are both medium-light tactical vehicles that are designed to move soldiers through areas that require an enclosed vehicles, however, in the TO&E cited in Supplemental Manual 3-90, which is from 2016 so it will not be completely accurate, the JLTV and humvee are used in a mix of support and mobility roles. For infantry battalions, the only rifle squads to receive JLTVs would be in the weapons company, however mortars, unit commanders, and a few other units also get JLTVs. The Army plans to field the ISV to all rifle squads, but it’s not replacing the JLTV or Humvee. Both of those vehicles serve different roles than ISV is planned to, and many of them couldn’t be replaced by ISV anyhow. Maybe what has inspired this push is the “conversion of infantry brigade combat team weapons companies to platoons”, and then in February of this year the final conversion of those to reform the D company of infantry battalions as a Multipurpose Company, or MPC.
It is unclear if these new companies will use JLTV or ISV, but the TO&E shown above seems to imply that it would be ISV, since the ISV is the only 9-seat vehicle issued to infantry the US operates besides the FMTV. The “5 seat” would also imply ISV, but also potentially JLTV which has 5 seats for the M1279 Heavy Weapons Carrier variant and the M1278 Heavy Guns Carrier variant. All other variants have 4 seats. If the entire companty is switching to ISV, that could imply that the US infantry battalion as a whole might be divesting from JLTV assets.
Organization of the MPC, Photo from US Army
What We Do Not Know
Multiple news articles have claimed that in addition to the aforementioned vehicle cuts, “AMPV (Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles) production will be reduced to minimum sustainment rate but mitigated by Ukraine buyback. Stryker will not award further production orders in accordance with the AROC”. Minimum sustainment rate generally means that they will only be producing the required parts and hulls to sustain the existing fleet of vehicles that the Army operates, but doesn’t explicitly state that the vehicle will not be procured in the future. A letter sent by Glenn Dean allegedly talked about transferring AMPVs to Ukraine, but we have no confirmation as to the authenticity of that. As for the Strykers, it’s about as clear cut as it can be, no more strykers will be ordered by the Army. Minimum sustainment production will still likely be in effect, as there are currently no plans to reduce the amount of strykers in the force. This doesn’t really make sense unless the Army plans to honor its existing stryker contracts, including M-SHORAD, which given the aforementioned plans to expand C-UAS capabilities would make sense. We’ve also seen the USMC testing and planning to implement JLTV based C-UAS systems, such as MADIS Mk.2. In addition, directed energy weapons based on strykers have been in development and testing for some time. It is unclear if these are going to be canceled.
Analysis and Conclusion
The Army plans to cancel a number of armored vehicle programs, while accelerating development of the M1E3 Main Battle Tank and the XM30 Infantry Fighting Vehicle. This begs the question if the Army plans to replace Strykers with XM30s at some point, because new hulls will be required eventually. This would be a major capability loss. The Stryker, at 19 tons, is a light wheeled APC which allows armored divisions to rapidly maneuver mechanized infantry into positions that the heavier Bradley and Abrams, at 36 and 73 tons respectively, cannot reach. In addition, they are faster, more mobile, and bring more firepower than an infantry brigade combat team, while having a much lighter logistical load than an armored brigade combat team. They bridge the gap between infantry and armor, and are a core component of US armored divisions. Losing strykers, or just wheeled 8x8 APCs in general would be a mistake. While the XM30 will likely be an even more effective version of the Bradley, it is not a replacement for the stryker. In addition, stopping AMPV deliveries is a terrible mistake, given that they do not primarily serve combat roles and instead serve to replace the aging M113s the Army still operates. With every year that goes by, M113 parts become rarer and rarer and more hulls become unserviceable. Stopping JLTV production is also a mistake, as if we were to go to war, we would need to replace JLTVs quickly, and production would take time to restart. The JLTV has been proven to be an effective fighting vehicle, and on top of that in the age of drones without propper C-UAS systems, which the Army does not currently field, vehicles like the ISV which are unarmored could become easy targets.
If you’ve read this far thanks very much, I’d love to hear your thoughts and opinions on this, given this is my first time writing something like this.
*forgot to mention, this is not complete and I have many things I’d like to add to it.
