Analysis of AMPV, JLTV, Stryker, and M10 Decisions (March 1-15)

March 1-15 DoD Announcements Analysis


Many people cite lessons learned in Ukraine to justify major changes to US doctrine, but it’s worth noting that the war we were supposedly learning so much from is a war in which neither side is winning and both sides suffer massive casualties. Is that how we want our next conflict to go? Drone warfare is supposedly the next great thing, but EW and C-UAS systems force the price of drones to rise and rise. At which point does the means, drones required to destroy a single armored vehicle, justify the end, destroying said vehicle? The drone age is not going to last, and it’s important to not dig ourselves into a position that we cannot practically climb out of.

What We Know


On April 30th, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth published a memo dictating a reduction of “excess ground vehicles”. Now this memo on its own didn’t actually provide much clarity as to what that meant, aside from mentioning Humvees and the MQ-1C as examples for what might be on the chopping block, but on March 1st we got a release from the Secretary of the Army, Dan Driscol. He clarified that the Army would “cancel procurement” of “excess ground vehicles like the HMMWV and JLTV”. He also announced that procurement of the AH-64D would be stopped, all of this supposedly in favor of integrating “long range missiles and modernized UAS into formations” in addition to plans to “field the M1E3 tank, develop the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft, and close the C-sUAS capability gap”. As of the writing of this article we have no word regarding the specific extent of which this covers. This might or might not mean that existing contracts for JLTV, which the US has backlogs of that stretch all the way into 2027, will be canceled. It could also mean that once these contracts are completed, the DoD will no longer be procuring systems.

So in regards to those areas, it seems pretty clear that the DoD wants to cut things that might not make sense to keep procuring. Attack helicopters as a whole have faced constant criticism due to vulnerabilities in the deep strike role, primarily because of light plentiful MANPADS (Man-Portable-Air-Defense-Systems). In the war on terror, the US was forced to rethink its approach to attack helicopters. Instead of using them in the deep strike and reconnaissance roles, they “conducted effective armed reconnaissance and close shaping missions”, which is to say instead of putting themselves at extreme risk, they ended up giving a lot more direct on station support to grunts. The war in Ukraine has changed things. Early war statistics suggested that Russia may have lost as much as a fourth of its entire fleet of KA-52 attack helicopters, however evolving tactics have allowed them to still be somewhat effective on the battlefield. One idea for attack helicopters was to use them as platforms to launch drones, and act as a central hub for them. What it comes down to though, is that the age of the attack helo may have passed.

Moving on to the humvee and JLTV, these are both medium-light tactical vehicles that are designed to move soldiers through areas that require an enclosed vehicles, however, in the TO&E cited in Supplemental Manual 3-90, which is from 2016 so it will not be completely accurate, the JLTV and humvee are used in a mix of support and mobility roles. For infantry battalions, the only rifle squads to receive JLTVs would be in the weapons company, however mortars, unit commanders, and a few other units also get JLTVs. The Army plans to field the ISV to all rifle squads, but it’s not replacing the JLTV or Humvee. Both of those vehicles serve different roles than ISV is planned to, and many of them couldn’t be replaced by ISV anyhow. Maybe what has inspired this push is the “conversion of infantry brigade combat team weapons companies to platoons”, and then in February of this year the final conversion of those to reform the D company of infantry battalions as a Multipurpose Company, or MPC.

It is unclear if these new companies will use JLTV or ISV, but the TO&E shown above seems to imply that it would be ISV, since the ISV is the only 9-seat vehicle issued to infantry the US operates besides the FMTV. The “5 seat” would also imply ISV, but also potentially JLTV which has 5 seats for the M1279 Heavy Weapons Carrier variant and the M1278 Heavy Guns Carrier variant. All other variants have 4 seats. If the entire companty is switching to ISV, that could imply that the US infantry battalion as a whole might be divesting from JLTV assets.

Organization of the MPC, Photo from US Army

What We Do Not Know


Multiple news articles have claimed that in addition to the aforementioned vehicle cuts, “AMPV (Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles) production will be reduced to minimum sustainment rate but mitigated by Ukraine buyback. Stryker will not award further production orders in accordance with the AROC”. Minimum sustainment rate generally means that they will only be producing the required parts and hulls to sustain the existing fleet of vehicles that the Army operates, but doesn’t explicitly state that the vehicle will not be procured in the future. A letter sent by Glenn Dean allegedly talked about transferring AMPVs to Ukraine, but we have no confirmation as to the authenticity of that. As for the Strykers, it’s about as clear cut as it can be, no more strykers will be ordered by the Army. Minimum sustainment production will still likely be in effect, as there are currently no plans to reduce the amount of strykers in the force. This doesn’t really make sense unless the Army plans to honor its existing stryker contracts, including M-SHORAD, which given the aforementioned plans to expand C-UAS capabilities would make sense. We’ve also seen the USMC testing and planning to implement JLTV based C-UAS systems, such as MADIS Mk.2. In addition, directed energy weapons based on strykers have been in development and testing for some time. It is unclear if these are going to be canceled.

Analysis and Conclusion


The Army plans to cancel a number of armored vehicle programs, while accelerating development of the M1E3 Main Battle Tank and the XM30 Infantry Fighting Vehicle. This begs the question if the Army plans to replace Strykers with XM30s at some point, because new hulls will be required eventually. This would be a major capability loss. The Stryker, at 19 tons, is a light wheeled APC which allows armored divisions to rapidly maneuver mechanized infantry into positions that the heavier Bradley and Abrams, at 36 and 73 tons respectively, cannot reach. In addition, they are faster, more mobile, and bring more firepower than an infantry brigade combat team, while having a much lighter logistical load than an armored brigade combat team. They bridge the gap between infantry and armor, and are a core component of US armored divisions. Losing strykers, or just wheeled 8x8 APCs in general would be a mistake. While the XM30 will likely be an even more effective version of the Bradley, it is not a replacement for the stryker. In addition, stopping AMPV deliveries is a terrible mistake, given that they do not primarily serve combat roles and instead serve to replace the aging M113s the Army still operates. With every year that goes by, M113 parts become rarer and rarer and more hulls become unserviceable. Stopping JLTV production is also a mistake, as if we were to go to war, we would need to replace JLTVs quickly, and production would take time to restart. The JLTV has been proven to be an effective fighting vehicle, and on top of that in the age of drones without propper C-UAS systems, which the Army does not currently field, vehicles like the ISV which are unarmored could become easy targets.

If you’ve read this far thanks very much, I’d love to hear your thoughts and opinions on this, given this is my first time writing something like this.

*forgot to mention, this is not complete and I have many things I’d like to add to it.

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The only thing that I believe I know is that almost all vehicle development and production needs to evaluate the rapid development in Ukraine. Stop & Rethink.

Russias vast tank armadas are nearly gone, loading down tanks with “armoured” sheds doesn’t
work. When tanks, regardless of which tank it is, ventures out in the open they become vulnerable to attack drones. Drones can be cheap and simple and they can be big and expensive. Anti-tank missiles are expensive but they are still “value for money” when killing tanks. Cheaper drones are so cheap that they can be expended on individual soldiers, soldiers on bikes, soldiers on scooters, soldiers in converted civilian vehicles. Hand grenades that can fly …

Maybe the latest political decisions regarding procurement are based on the need to evaluate and eventually redesign, maybe it is just a desperate decision to cut down on federal expenses.
Whatever the real reason is I do think it is wise to stop and rethink.

In WW I very simple aircraft flew in over the trenches to do reconnaisance and then someone got the bright idea of tossing small grenades, in WW II we ended up with nuclear weapons dropped from aircraft, then we got the ICBM’s and now we have very small flying things dropping small grenades. Ukraine turned to drones out of necessity and now the drones are becoming a small scale airforce able to deliver explosives with pin-point precision, chasing cars, motorcycles and armour along the dirt roads. Everything that moves needs to consider this new threat.
The danger zone that used to be from the front lines back to a few miles behind the front nnow extends 10 or 20 miles behind the front. Artillery is being hunted 10 - 20 miles behind the front.
Some systems can’t even fire beyond the front line because the drone threat havs pushed them too far back. Tanks that can withstand a LOT in the frontal 60 degree arc and a fair amount from the sides are basically tin-cans seen from the drones point of view.

I do not have any solutions and I haven’t heard about any viable solutions either.
Partial solutions exist or are being developed and should preferably be tested in the most
realistic test environment we currently have access to (send it to Ukraine and see if it works).

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I agree, and from what I’ve scene the USMC’s Madis mk2 might be the most promising realistic solution right now, that or the jammers they’re using. I think from a fundamental perspective it doesn’t make sense to cancel AMPV, especially because it’s actually a great platform for C-UAS systems from what I’ve seen.

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My problem with canceling the AMPV and JLTV is I have worked on the aging platforms that these are meant to replace and to stop them now and move on I feel like we are setting up our service members up for failure by not providing them with the equipment needed to take the fight to the enemy. Any war we fight most likely will not be on US soil and without providing current equipment we and sending them into the fight with one hand tied behind their backs. I can almost guarantee that the countries we will be fighting are not cutting programs they are growing and developing their militaries.

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@M1A2_SEPv2_Abrams That is a very nice analysis and write up. I don’t really see this happen much anymore on the modeling forums, then again, I just visit Armorama now and not the other modeling forums.

You won’t find this deep critical thinking on Armorama, but you will find it on LinkedIn. LinkedIn is where career people go to post and discuss such topics, but LinkedIn is open to everyone (it’s free) just like Armorama, which means spies, trolls, flamers, non-NATO nations, and jerks can read and post on LinkedIn too if they have an account.

The problem with the cost-cutting and the armor programs cancellations is that the active US Army is often tasked with defending and responding to practically every single threat there is. No other US military branch is equipped with such vehicles, gear, weapons, training, and equipment to “Do it all,” and the US Marines, Special Forces, National Guard, etc. don’t come close. Canceling HMMWVs and JLTVs means fewer vehicles to respond to natural disasters. Currently, FPV $200-$2,000 drones cannot lift humans out of homes or ford floods an shelter them. A family of four won’t fit in a quad-rotor drone. And in serve hailstorms, rain, lightning strikes, and wind, you don’t want to be driving around in an open ISV rescuing people. Some hail is the size of golfballs—you need an armored vehicle to drive through that. Thus, I am not sure if the Pentagon folks actually realize what they’re doing cutting armor programs and staff just because of the FPV drone threat and because “The Big Boss” said so. This seems akin to a lack of experience, understanding, and being so sanctimonious that the Pentagon and Army Top Brass don’t quite understand what the troops are doing.

Case in point, SECDEF just cut the Pentagon’s Operational Test and Evaluation (ODOT&E) in half. Thus, any accident means that SECDEF is “responsible” for the injury and/or Soldiers’ deaths. When Operational Test and Evaluation (ODOT&E) employees travel, it’s best to travel with an “adequate number of people team,” not solo, to conduct testing and evaluations. 82 ODOT&E civilians have been reduced to 30 and 12 military personnel bumped up to 15. Is the US Military that bankrupt as to cut so many DoD civilians?

Is the Pentagon so “hard up” on funds for like Golden Dome that ODOT&E has to be reduced by half? ODOT&E’s sole job is to test new weapons programs such as Golden Dome.

Bottom line, if the Pentagon cuts too many next-generation Army vehicle programs, then the Pentagon won’t be able to respond to all threats globally. The JLTV is the primary fighting vehicle in the US Marines, so the Marines aren’t happy as the price of the JLTV sure went up now that the US Army bailed out without telling the Marines (and you won’t really see that posted on LinkedIn because no one wants to get fired or lose their job making that comment, but the media sure did). USSOCOM didn’t say anything officially about the armor program cancellations, but if a FPV $200-$1,000 drone has a range of 10 miles, what are SOFs going to do…walk the rest of the way or use Toyota pickups which sure aren’t “USA origin”…to launch their drones?

It’s one thing to “Not care about the US Military,” and quite another thing to be “Misinformed” about what is going on. SECDEF is not under any savings or cost-cutting quota or number goal that he has to reach. Thus, I really wonder what made him decide to axe so many programs that have matured to the point that they were just entering service.

As for the AH-64D cancellation, the Longbow Apache is said to be able to detect FPV drones with the Longbow radar, and with Anduril’s Barracuda cruise missies (still in testing…remember ODOT&E got halved), the lightest one can fire from about 93 miles away! Hellfire ATGM can only fly for 5 miles. Thus, a FPV hobby drone with a range of 10 miles can’t seem to compete against an AH-64E with a range of 296 miles + 93 miles for Barracuda missiles = around 400 miles range one way.

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Thanks, this is some great input. I plan to take my findings to my congressman once I have matured my information enough. I doubt it will go anywhere but I’m willing to take whatever I can get. I agree with what you said about cutting programs that are basically fully matured. Tbh when I first saw the cuts I was literally like “what vehicles will we even have left?”. Without JLTV/Humvee, Stryker, and AMPV within like 20 years the army will be reduced to tanks, IFVs, and glorified golf carts. I have no idea what we’re supposed to do when we actually have to deliver capabilities to the battlefield. I don’t think SecDef understands that drones do so well in Ukraine because its such a large environment that you can’t really watch everything at once, but if we go into Taiwan we’ll have an equal number of troops in like 5% of the area or something. Every single unit will need to be insanely survivable, and capable of dealing with an encounter with armor organized in a breakthrough formation. Tank battles will be seen again. Vehicle and troops density on the island will be absurdly high. Simple EW and CAS systems will be able to defend large stretches of units at once. I don’t think we should be divesting from our heavier fighting assets.

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To clarify, if our infantry are going into combat and are using ISV in the same way we’ve been using JLTV we’ll have some serious losses. I would really like to see JLTV retained, and C-UAS systems built around that platform.

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Army could literally just steal what the USMC has made so far. RnD is done.

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:+1:
That may well be the real reasons

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But we like having new toys, it happens so rarely.

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When Soldiers are on sentry duty, it pays to have an armored vehicle handy, whether tracked or wheeled, to move around, load and unload cargo and Soldiers, conduct command and control and communications, recon, and give a physical presence. Remember, drones cannot rescue people, nor can drones transport humans to render all sorts of human-capable aid, senses, and languages. Thus, I am surprised at the “guillotine-like” approach that the US Army has enacted on its own armored vehicle programs. It’s not axing, it’s guillotining the head of these programs off. And worse off, there are no replacements on the horizon. The Remote Combat Vehicle (RCV) family, remote-operated, got guillotined, and that came in small, medium, and heavy remote-operated vehicles. What about the RCV that the SECDEF didn’t like is beyond me because those are unmanned and can be made into autonomous drones (Google’s Waymo robot taxis drive very well day and night—fully autonomous, but they can take hours to download WiFi updates just parked by the curb). Note the “Combat” letter in RCV…these aren’t just unmanned vehicles.

Why so large, heavy, tall, and expensive for US armored vehicles? There are armored vehicle manufacturers overseas that design cool-looking armored vehicles, but some publish their armor levels, and if you look up that armor level, it’s proof against handguns only—and these are their combat vehicles. That’s because these armored vehicles aren’t meant for high-intensity combat, but internal conflicts and peacekeeping against grenades, shrapnel, mines, etc. in parts of the world where none of those nations’ citizens have access to assault rifles and there’s no such thing as a gun shop in those nations.

I recall seeing an AM General ad in a 1990s Defense magazine showcasing the M1114 HMMWV door armor taking multiple hits of 7.62mm NATO and 12.7mm rounds in a ballistic photo. You won’t see such a ballistic photo anymore after 9/11/2001. The M1114 armored door stood up to multiple rounds (at least 20+) of 7.62mm and the door had three solid impacts of 12.7mm, one round in the ballistic glass, none penetrated. Bear in mind that this is 12.7mm NATO, not Russian 14.5mm AP. That is why US armored vehicles are so expensive, large, heavy, tall, and capable because their armor is more capable than just resisting handgun rounds.

For the US Army, the new armor standard is often Russian 14.5mm, or 14.5mm AP, and that is considered “light armor” for US AFVs. It won’t get cheaper and lighter anytime soon for the US Army.

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I suspect the current SecDef will not reach the end of this Administration and that the next Administration (and maybe the next SecDef) will be undoing more than one of these decisions. Too many companies have an interest in building things for the US military to give up that particular golden goose. My own thoughts is that the Booker will die, drones and naval UAVs will proliferate, and we will go back to making trucks and vehicles like we have for decades now.

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also being important employers in many areas where senators and members of the
house want to get reelected …

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This is why I believe this Project 2025 nonsense will fail. There is too much federal money in supplying the government and military.

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The underlying problem is that the US Department of Defense (DoD) realized that Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) where the DoD closed Navy shipyards, Army bases, Air Force airfields, etc. was a mistake to certain degrees. Any BRAC savings were eaten by the Global War on Terror which some estimates place at around $8 TRILLION dollars for 22 years for a dubious result.

Because of GWOT and spending on it, a lot of US DoD “WW3-preparation programs” need modernization and replacement from Minuteman III ICBM replacements to Ohio-class nuclear missile sub replacements to B-21 Stealth bombers to Air Force Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighters to Space Force to new US Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter icebreakers to new Air Force refueling planes to new engines for the B-52s. Many of these new programs are behind schedule, over budget, and have technical challenges and stretch for years. To top it off, recruitment levels are often down and miss quota, resulting in reenlistment bonuses that are very good sums of money.

I have not really read that the US Army programs that SECDEF canceled had (m)any problems besides the M109 ERCA that had premature barrel wear. SECDEF guillotined the “Winners.” The DoD knew this for years that the replacement programs are behind schedule and over budget. Even the new Presidential Air Force Ones are behind schedule and over budget. I don’t know how SECDEF could have gotten “Sticker shock” by all these DoD programs that are way behind deliveries because it seems that the Defense industrial complex doesn’t quite know what it’s doing sometimes and constantly blames Supply Chain issues and COVID, which the Pentagon’s Top Brass is no longer buying that excuse. Defense is conglomerated into a few huge Defense corporations, but a lot of new Defense startups are also emerging.

The truth is that a lot of Defense workers have retired during the pandemic and once retired, they didn’t have to train any replacements. Thus, years from the pandemic, the harsh truth appears in that the Defense industrial complex workers, especially the shipyard workers, lack experience to keep up with demands and schedules. It’s somewhat true in that America doesn’t quite know how to build ships anymore because those that did have retired.

Golden Dome anti-missile system also will take up funds.

The irony is that AMPV, JLTV, Stryker, and M10 will most likely be used and deployed compared to Columbia-class SSBNs, Sentinel ICBMs, B-21 “Raiders,” and NGAD that can sit for years or decades and never see battle. US weapon systems are just costing more because they’re getting more complex and more capable…the demands for more performance expectations are there.

China and Russia are demonstrating that they can counter US and NATO weapons and also develop new and innovative weapons that the US and NATO have no counters to.

Regarding the M10 Booker, the truth is that NATO is having financial military and production problems…the head of NATO is calling for rearming, but NATO doesn’t see it seriously as many of their weapons are being diverted to Ukraine. Most NATO navies don’t have anything larger than a corvette or a frigate, most don’t even have a warship that is the size of a destroyer, let alone a cruiser. NATO cannot be depended upon to defend itself because it lacks the monetary and willpower to do so because their militaries aren’t quite seen as an honorable job like the US military’s. I spoke to a Canadian modeler decades ago and he said that no one will want, invade, and hold Canadian land because it’s just too darn cold to. And yet the wars around the world have raged for years to decades. That is why the US Army needs the canceled armored vehicles because don’t expect the allies to have and supply them; they do need to be shipped over to move US Soldiers and cargo to objectives. Drones can’t do it alone. “No Air Force has ever held ground. If you want to hold the ground, you must have forces on it to physically occupy it” is a quote made by a late general on PBS’s NOVA TV show in the 1990s.

The “Hard stop” that SECDEF placed on the US Army’s armored vehicle program means that “Quantity has a quality” all its own is being affected. By not producing, time is money, and time is being wasted because the US Army has and needs a numerous fleet of vehicles to be a superior army. More vehicles equates to more firepower and logistics hauling capacity because drones can’t do it. Soldiers often don’t follow drones into battle, and those drones that they do follow, such as the RCVs, are canceled.

So, yes, it is all about money, but the Pentagon said nothing about suing Defense corporations for poor performance, corruption, mismanagement, faulty systems, or program mistakes.

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Not quite true.
We consider weapons sent to Ukraine to be the best usage of those weapons at the moment.
Keep Russia occupied while we are rearming. Ukraine is also an excellent testing ground to
see what works and what doesn’t, including using drones to attack and figuring out how to
defend against drones.

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I sit corrected; however, NATO is composed of many nations and I read that some are struggling to justify modernization and expansion efforts = sticker shock.

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Don’t forget the USAF is still using planes from the 1950’s (last built in 1962) and will for another 20 years and at this rate that might be longer.

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