With respect I am not sure this is entirely true; it is certainly not reflected by the military mission reports regularly presented at the time.
I have to say at this point I have not seen any iteration of any plan of Soviet/Warsaw Pact, though understand it is now easily available.
In the late 70s as far as I recall the units of GSFG were fully equipped with T-62 and T-55, but T-64 began to be delivered from the early 70s, (possibly earlier) although would take some time to replace T-62 in Soviet units. One may have found T-34s in reserve stockpiles but generally, not least with the introduction of T-64, and T-72, Soviet and WP forces were equipped with a particularly lethal AFV. Those countries’ arsenals that didn’t have T-72 yet, would still have possessed comprehensive T-54/T-55 AFV fleets. Ditto Mig 15s, which I’m sure would be stockpiled somewhere, but even the 2nd Eleven (if you like) countries would by the timescale have largely had at least Mig 21s (and others)in their arsenal.
Certainly, troops were rotated from units to assist in the annual harvests, but this had been the norm for some decades.
I feel the large-scale exercises, “Brothers in Arms” series for example, actually gave an impression of no small coordination between Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies.
I would refer readers to the comments I made a year ago on this thread:
“From the late 70s to the end of the Soviet bloc, there were qualitative improvements in most of their arsenal. General Zaitsev - Commander GSFG 1980-85 - in particular accelerated the introduction of very capable equipments and also made doctrinal and organisational advancements such as establishing Operational Manoeuvre Groups.
The military liaison missions in East Germany continuously observed and reported on all of this and NATO had every right to be worried, as indeed, it was. GSFG (later WGF) was a very capable organisation; they were well equipped, undertook rigorous training, well led (within the confining strictures of the Communist system) and I suspect would have ultimately prevailed. I think NATO would not have made it easy for them, but would, as I say, go nuclear quite soon.
GSFG/WGF was a very different beast to today’s Russian Army.
The exercises I was involved in at Army Group level normally went “nuclear” after around 5-6 days. That of course, was within the exercise scenarios, but these documents were carefully drafted, and drew on lots of experience and hard-won intelligence.”
This not to deify Soviet troops by any means, but they and their WP comrades were well equipped generally; as for their training, there is a tendency to compare directly with NATO methodologies, but this is to compare apples with pears. Just because training methods appear perhaps cumbersome and unimaginative it doesn’t mean they are less than effective. They were of course, dealing with conscripts, but by and large, so were NATO.
I quote here from an account given of a briefing for potential military mission (Brit) operatives:
“He was advertised as a specialist from Ashford (British Army’s intelligence centre) dealing with all aspects of the Warsaw Pact. He made us look at the West’s military capability from the Soviet point of view. He disagreed that Soviet equipment was inferior. He disagreed that learning tactics by rote was necessarily a handicap. He argued strongly that superiority of numbers alone might carry the day. He introduced the Soviet concept of reinforcing success and abandoning failure. He implied that it was by no means certain that we would win an encounter with the Warsaw Pact”.
As I say, I am not putting the Soviet/WP forces on a pedestal (somewhat, on occasion, akin to devotees of the Wehrmacht perhaps) but the forces stated in East Germany presented a very real and deadly threat throughout the Cold War.
