[quote=“BootsDMS, post:119, topic:23117, full:true”]
You might wish to scroll back and review some of the earlier comments; throughout the 70s and 80s there were some serious qualitative improvements to the Soviet arsenal. Their tactical doctrine was also updated and constantly evolving, not least the with the formation of OMGs.[/quote]
Before I posted, I reviewed this entire thread. My point differs from those that posted before me, in that I took the approach of economies. No military can exist without a national economy to provide the financing to build and maintain a military. The Soviet Union could never match the combined economies of the west, and particularly, the Soviet Union could never match the economy of the U.S thus they couldn’t match the expenses NATO and especially the U.S were willing to spend on defense.
Of course they tried, but they had no meaningful way to generate money. Further worsened by the fact that they economically supported the rest of the Warsaw pact. They were like a person with a credit card, but no income. They couldn’t make the payments on the debit, and as a result, they eventually maxed out their economy and the Soviet Union collapsed. The truth was, they knew they didn’t have the economic power to beat NATO and they took technological short cuts to economize on their expenses especially towards the end. I’m not suggesting that they never tried to improve, but improvements cost money and they didn’t have the money.
We could discuss the advantages that Soviet tanks possessed over NATO tanks, but In the end, no matter how many perceived advantages, the Soviets couldn’t maintain it. And that was apparently more important than the size of cannons or the thickness of armor.
We all know that the failure of the Soviet system was economic - it just couldn’t be sustained as you highlight, but I think you have answered the wrong question(!)
@Uncle-Heavy no Russian doctrine has changed to an extent since the Cold War. First real change came with the deployment of Battalion tactical groups (btg) that are supposed to be self contained and consisting of direct attachments of mechanized forces with self propelled guns. They moved away from what my father who served in the fulda gap called “sprocket to sprocket” style tactics.
Russia first unveiled this new doctrine during the South Ossetia conflict in Georgia and it showed it could be done but needs some tuning. The major problem is that you now have battalions with three to four different platform and chassis and having to maintain that with a company of maintainers. Ontop of that logistics are an after thought and usually ran by a warrant like officer, at least that is what the “Russian way of war” has described it if i remember correctly.
The problem right now is that Russia studied the American invasion of Iraq. They, in the first three days attempted to conduct decapitation strikes against Ukraine and struck at major infrastructure, including 5G towers. The Russians used all their high tech and expensive weapons in the first three days, all the smart missiles they showed off were launched and made initial impacts. The problem they ran into is they don’t have the supply of them that the U.S. does nor do they have the economy to produce them at a vast quantity that doesn’t bankrupt them.
The Ukrainians defended well against the shock and awe that was the Holmstead airport battle and neutralized what were considered elite VDV units. When the Russians gained a foothold in Ukraine they had a hard time communicating because they use 5G towers for their signals , ie: radios , which to my knowledge aren’t as well encrypted.
I wasn’t answering the wrong question, I was answering the same question considering the economic reality. Here is an irrefutable truth. Everything costs money. Nothing pops out of thin air. Warships, planes, tanks, all of it is expensive stuff. So when we talk about things like tanks and such, it didn’t just appear out of nothing, someone had to come up with all the resources to develop and build those things, and a key resource is having the money. The Soviets built up a massive arsenal over the decades it existed with no means to pay for it. And they knew this. So it’s reasonable to assume that if they lacked money, they had to take shortcuts and economize, save money wherever they could. Based on this irrefutable truth, they could not have had the “best” because they couldn’t afford it. They could only afford the minimum, and only made improvements whenever they could afford it. Knowing they couldn’t afford the best possible tanks, they just kept building large numbers of cheaper tanks, which from the economic viewpoint was equally as bad.
I believe that Sun Tzu had discussed the importance of resources in his book, ‘The Art of War’ The Soviet Union didn’t have the resources (money) to beat the combined resources of NATO and the attempt to keep up eventually broke them.
A dysfunctional economy may not necessarily impact the efficiency of the troops in the field; Fred asked if we thought NATO could prevail had the Cold War turned hot without going nuclear. This led to a protracted discourse for over two years including radioactive bananas and Monty Python (!)
I think it was generally agreed - though I might be wrong - that NATO would have to go nuclear after around 5 days or so.
GSFG was a coherent and capable force; with its Warsaw Pact allies it also greatly outnumbered NATO forces. As I say, a dysfunctional economy does not necessarily impact at the tactical level; just consider the Wehrmacht’s efforts even though chaos reigned at home. It will eventually perhaps, if, after time, logistics begin to fray, but we’re talking only around a week here, and the Soviets had stocks in place just as we did. We’re also talking about the 70s/early 80s here and the disintegration of the Soviet Union was still some way off.
They were also not just fielding cheap tanks; as I mentioned before, the T-64, T-72 et al were some of the most technically capable AFVs in the world. Their artillery systems (both tube and SSM) were extremely capable and modern, ditto their target acquisition capability.
It’s partly a function of wealth and money BUT and the West seems to have forgotten this, it’s also a function of having an industrial base with means of production to make war materials.
In other words, having a 100 Trillion dollar year GDP means next to nothing if its all desktop jockies at home trading bitcoin, mining bitcoin, denying insurance claims, playing the market, etc that nation can’t actually make many war materials.
Economic fluff & fat shouldn’t be mistaken for Economic war potential. Case in point, the entire West can’t rapidly supply an excess of 155mm artillery shells to support a limited conventional conflict to ONE nation.
I’d discount 50% of Western total war potential based on GDP numbers in the 21st century due to weak industrial base and lack of basic manufacturing, general absence of worthwhile skills, poor to nonexistent work ethic in the workforce plus institutionalized ignorance and entitlement (people are lazy these days).
I believe a dysfunctional economy could impact the efficiency of the troops in the field, because it is that economy which has to feed the troops, clothe the troops, provide medical care, train those troops, and of course pay those troops. None of that is free.
I know “Fred” asked if NATO could prevail if the Cold War turned hot without going nuclear. Besides the thread drift, the classic answers seem to concentrate on the quantity of Soviet armor and quality of Soviet armor. Historically there are many who believe the Soviets fielded some of the best armor, in that time, and they support that view with specifications such as armor thickness, caliber of main gun, the overall speed of the vehicle. While pointing out the relative weaknesses in NATO armor. Then there’s the sheer numbers that the Soviets fielded, which NATO could not match. And the conclusion is (Which I also believed when I was a young Marine, crewing a relatively obsolete tank) The Soviets would flood the battlefield with wave after wave of tanks which NATO could not repel.
So was this possible? In retrospect, I do not believe so. Starting with the quality. The Soviets did not necessarily have the highest quality of tank when you consider that the costs of producing a high quality tanks is eye wateringly high. The Soviet Union simply did not at any time possess an economy that allowed them spend a great deal of money on a tank, no less hundreds of thousands of tanks. Which brings up quantity. Contrary to popular opinion, the Soviets were never going to charge thru the Fulda Gap with hundreds of thousands of top of the line T-64s and T-72s. They simply didn’t possess ‘that’ many. In actuality the vast majority of tanks that probably would have participated would be older T-55s and T-62s, and I would even suspect an occasional T-34/85 to pad the numbers. So in that sense, the majority of tanks would be older lower quality outdated tanks.
Considering the battle, the obvious scenario would have involved nukes, because why not? I mean, if the Soviets were going to send a hundred thousand tanks across a narrow passage, a single nuke would basically wipe out the entire force and deny the Soviets a great portion of their tanks that they would need in the battles ahead. Likewise, the Soviets would want to use nukes of their own to blunt NATO’s attempts to repel them. Sure NATO could go conventional and take out a large number of Soviet tanks, from the air since NATO possessed superior air power at the time.
Considering the economics. Before you can make battle plans, you first need to build a military and that requires money. The Soviets did not have the money and therefore they had to economize everywhere to save what little money they had to invest. In a hot war whether it be nuclear or conventional, the Soviets would have likely run out of money long before NATO and collapsed sooner than they eventually did in peacetime.
I truly think the Russian way of thinking about war has not changed much from WW2. Their economy was crap in WW2. They had to move entire factories further east. They needed equipment quickly because it was being destroyed. They needed manpower quickly to replace losses so training was short. Much of their doctern was to overwhelm in numbers to offset the German advantages. Today the drone has forced them to change tactics, but the issue of equipment and training hasn’t changed. You might say that the economy is partly responsible however I think the Russian mindset plays a larger role. I think they would prefer to walk to Kiev behind a rolling artillery wave. Today’s Tech is making that difficult. Another piece of the pie is their willingness to participate in a meatgrinder. From an outsiders point of view, it seems like the men and equipment are of low value and losing a disproportional amount of men and equipment per kilometer is normal and expected. You have to keep in mind that they know they can fall back on their nuclear stockpiles so they can’t lose if things go badly wrong. No one will be marching through Moscow other than Russians.
Any mindset will depend on if they have the economy to support it. The Soviets didn’t have a lot of money so they economized everywhere they could. In WW2 they were fighting a foe who also didn’t have economic resources. Rather then spend resources on tanks and other weapons that they could better afford and easily build, Hitler, spent his resources on expensive, complex wonder weapons that ultimately did little to change the outcome of the war. For example, It was said that it took hundreds of men to build a Maus. The cost to produce one Maus was equal to many Panzer 4s. They simply mismanaged their limited resources and it cost them the war… The Soviets were a little smarter in how they spent their own limited resources and cash.
The current Russian federation has a far smaller economy than the former Soviet Union so when they started the war in Ukraine, the mindset was to win via shock and awe, but they didn’t have the resources to pull it off and they lost the initiative. So now they are fighting a war with very little money and resources hoping that the alliance with China and N. Korea will infuse their efforts with new cash and resources. While Ukraine is relying on the West to do the same
I remember My Dad doing the alerts and constant field time in Germany 3rd Armored and 1st Armored Divisions. I’ve always tried to research that time frame and have picked up a few books among many that I’ve read in the past here’s just a few along with an Army technical manual I remember
Edro, that is my primary question. The drift of this thread is equally fascinating and I appreciate the discussions the initial question has generated.
Guys, keep posting. I am learning a lot and appreciate your expertise and insight.
Although I did not serve during the CW, I happened to live in W. Germany from 1981-85 as a dependent.
I used to read Jane’s and any other sources I could find in the libraries. The West seemed to have the technological edge, it was the WP sheer numbers located along NATO borders.
We were well aware of the dependent airlift evacuation plan back to Canada in the event of a conflict. My father said NATO would be a huge speed bump until it went tactical nuclear or chemical. So that’s what they trained for.
My experience seeing Soviet equipment firsthand was after the fall of the Iron Curtain aboard cruiser “Marshal Ustinov” and destroyer “Admiral Kharlamov” in 1993. The ships looked intimidating and capable from afar, not so much close up. We highly doubted they could fire missiles, counter measures, or if anything worked at all. The state of the silos due to non-existing planned maintenance. Wiring was loose, the amount of layers of paint between rust on upper deck equipment. We could tell the upper decks were prettied up for the port visit. Below decks was the same story, but in filthy conditions. The technology honestly looked like it was from the 1950’s. Nothing looked modern for modern equipment.
Probably the USSR’s best shot at taking Europe was in May of 1945. Mobilized, capable army, Europe decimated by war and partly enslaved by the USSR into the Red Army and no nukes yet for the West.
Even the Warmonger Stalin wasn’t willing to roll the dice on that one.
After that it’s all a very slow ~45+ year slide into oblivion for the USSR.
For all of our bravado in the Berlin Brigade - Defenders of Freedom and all that - I think we were less than a speed bump. A pebble in the boot perhaps.
Berlin itself would definitely classify as a pebble no argument there, the remainder of W. Germany was a bigger speed bump. You start counting how many troops from NATO were stationed in W. Germany the numbers start to add up.
NATO troops in general were better trained, better equipped and professional armies. The US and Canada had long distance logistics downpat and the amount of war stock in Europe was impressive.
NATO always had superior air power in spades. We lived by an air base (next to the Rhine lol) which the runway could handle Starlifters and Galaxy’s. A stretch of the Autobahn very close to the base was also ample for heavy lift. I would see a lot of different types of aircraft and sometimes in numbers.
The window of opportunity for the Soviets to take Europe in 1945 was extremely small. The Trinity test took place in July 1945, which might have been pushed up if the Allied forces were in danger of losing. Several atomic bombs would be ready by August. Of course if all the bombs were used fighting the Soviets, the war in the Pacific would have lasted another year as the Army and Marines would have had to invade Japan, until there was another atomic bomb available to defeat the Japanese.
Definitely a high risk gambit but still the best window of opportunity for the USSR to take Europe. Thankfully, Stalin wasn’t up for the gambit. Typically poor USSR logistics and allied resistance probably would have been key in halting a Soviet advance around the border of France and Germany. Having all of Germany and the Iron Wall along the Rhine river wouldn’t have been too bad of an outcome for Stalin. What’s another 10 or 15 million lives lost when your Uncle Joe anyway.
BTW - Estimates to destroy the USSR require an excess of 5,500+ nuclear weapons exploding on target.
Absorption of ~10 to ~15 atomic bombs between July and December 1945 would be unpleasant but hardly decisive on their own against a determined USSR with Stalin at the helm.
