I hope you are not one of the ones drafted by Putin to go fight the war.
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The 1973 Yom Kippur war is absolutely a suitable example. It was a proxy war based on the invasion of a country friendly to the U.S., with the big difference clearly being that the Soviets weren’t doing the invading. Setting aside the effectiveness of the crews, the U.S. was shocked at the losses incurred. Based on intensive study, the U.S. determined that the Israeli M-60’s compared favorably to the T-62, however the loss ratios for tank on tank combat were too close for comfort.
Keep in mind that the top generals in the U.S. Military at the time were all still WWII veterans and had direct knowledge of the carnage of conventional warfare. The U.S. depleted its entire reserve stockpile of armor and anti-tank missiles to shore up Israel. In spite of grievous losses, the U.S.S.R.'s stockpiles had barely been touched. Although the TOW demonstrated its effectiveness late in the Vietnam War, military leaders in the U.S. had yet to conceive of the ability of the AT missile to wreck entire tank formations. They were blown away by the Sagger “briefcase missile”. It was said at the time that the era of the tank was over. That proved to be false. The U.S.'s response, per LTG DePuy (the founder of TRADOC), was that the U.S. and NATO could not possibly afford to field masses to match the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact (or even massed Arab armies). In the post-Vietnam Army, there was no way the U.S. could conceive of a draft, or of massive defense expenditures. LTG DePuy said that the U.S. needed tanks and crews that could fight and win at about a 5:1 ratio. That helped reinvigorate the XM-1 program in the ashes of the MBT-70. I’m sure that the Germans and the British drew the same conclusions. Rather than ditching tanks and armored vehicles, both sides took lessons from that war and they reinvested. Around that time we start seeing early reactive armor, laser range finders and thermal sights. In the 1950’s and 1960’s it was thought that HEAT made heavy armor obsolete. In the 1970’s, armies moved from HEAT to APFSDS. The conclusion then remains valid; the tank that hits first is most likely to win. The U.S. and NATO focused on crews and then new tanks that could hit and kill with the first shot in both day and night and in spite of traditional obscurants, such as fog or smoke. The Soviets likewise had their own lessons from 1973 which played into their doctrine and the refinement of the T-72 as well as the development of the T-80 and the creation of superb reactive armor tiles. But it was well known that Soviet tanks in the 1980’s were not equipped with anywhere near the sophistication in thermal and night sights.
The response to effective AT missiles, on the other hand, seemed to have been the creation of more effective AT missiles. Aside from reactive armor, there seemed to be no way around that threat. But the U.S. took the threat of massed Soviet tank assaults in stride and invested in asymmetric tactical doctrine leveraging existing technology - i.e., two men with a TOW in a jeep. From there, the “tank breaker” program was born.
Unlike the 1970’s generation of senior leaders, no one up to now has personally seen a major war. I see headlines saying, “The Russians lost 13 tanks today…” Well, that’s war. It stinks, but it really isn’t headline news. The U.S. Military and media has no concept of the destructiveness of mechanized, industrial warfare. One would conclude this applies to Europe as well. We’re accustomed to counting our losses on one hand, so we tend to feel smarmy when we have no idea how violent real warfare is.
One of my officers asked me this same question last spring based on the events in Ukraine. He was an armor and cavalry officer. I have a mech infantry background. So although it’s been a long time, I once knew the combined arms fight intimately. The answer to the question is a flat out “NO”. Troops still need transportation, firepower and support in a lethal environment. That won’t fall on stupid, up-armored trucks, nor on vulnerable rotary wing formations. We will still need powerful, armored vehicles to provide a punch and protected mobility. Until new designs are fielded, armies will have to depend on a myriad of field expedient lessons learned. That is why real information is critical - not meme reporting from major news outlets.
If we are able to sift through all the meme reporting on this war, we’ll start learning hard lessons that will necessarily cause changes in tank design. The 1973 war heavily influenced the radical Merkava design. Armored vehicle changes will probably lead to more sophisticated APS that are developed with Javelin type missiles in mind, rather than the hodgepodge, just-in-time efforts the U.S. deployed for Iraq to defeat RPG’s fired from rooftops. There will have to be other ways to physically defeat AT missiles - possibly leading to radical types of armor or the inclusion of EW systems to break or spoof a “fire and forget” missile lock. Eventually the U.S. will have to part ways with its favored child, the gas guzzling Abrams.
The infantryman in a tree line with an effective AT weapon has been a nightmare for mechanized forces since WWII. He will continue to be a threat. The Javelin is the successful realization of the 1980’s “tank breaker” program. I was a cadet when it was first introduced, and everyone was blown away by it. We knew it was a game changer 20 years ago. But no one had to do anything about it because we spent 20 years shooting Javelins at the Taliban on mountaintops for lack of better options. Its top attack destructive capacity is huge, but not nearly as important as its “fire and forget” feature allowing a man to displace and reload. Gone are the days of a fidgety, sweaty troop toggling a joystick and praying that his missile will hit before the back blast gives him away.
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I think the Arab Israeli wars might be as close as one can get to it Yuri is what Stik is saying I think.
Airspace control is important. But not a guarantee of success. In the Korean War, UN forces, a highly mechanized army, had supremacy at the time of the winter 1950/51 Chinese intervention, but that did not prevent the defeat of UN forces on the battlefield in North Korea, nor their being driven back to well south of Seoul. All AirPower did was lessen the level of defeat. The Chinese were able to attack successfully with no tactical air support.
Good points. I wouldn’t be surprised if we see a new gun for a tank that shoots a Javelin type missile. Think of the 152mm that the US had but a gun that actually works.
Very thoughtful and interesting response Travis. I was Mech infantry back in the 80s and we had the TOW and Dragon missile systems, I got to fire an AT-4 at Benning in 88 or 89 on a range at an old LVTP ( I think). Seemed like a powerful weapon at the time but being new, I didn’t know much about it and I don’t think it was used in combat yet. My buddies who I was in Germany with were TOW gunners and were pretty confident in the system, Dragon gunners not so much. We talked about Soviet armor all the time and how we would fare.
I cant remember where i saw a great cartoon, 3 Soviet Generals at a Paris Cafe after WWIII asking each other,“by the way,who won the air war”
Not ne necessarily true,but funny.
actually a pretty good post if I might say so. Lessons could well have been learned from that idea, but also are soon forgotten. The real issue was politics and not using supplied knowledge because you felt like you were above that. Still Market Garden should have served notice to everyone in an armed conflict, and is still most often ignored. Ignoring true intell will often ruin your day in the game of mortal combat
gary
To an infantry commander (or CAV) a tank is almost nothing but a “spear” used to break down hard points in a defensive structure. The other guy knows this, so he deploys tanks to stop other tanks from busting a hole in his line. Yet the tank can’t win on it’s own, as it needs the basic infantryman to go in there and do the dirty work. Infantry often speaks of arty as their “queen” in a giant chess match. After the rounds hit, guess who becomes the cleaning lady?
gary
Thanks for responses!
I have much respect for you guys. All of my more senior NCO’s when I was a lieutenant were 1980’s vintage and most were stationed in Germany at some point. It’s a good thing that the unthinkable didn’t happen. I’ve spent a great deal of time in recent years researching the late 1970’s - 1980’s Cold War and talking to retired armor and infantry officers from that period. The what-ifs are harrowing and fascinating at the same time.
Might have had a lot to do with the fact that the Germans had laid well over a million mines, you can’t just go skipping through those you know?
Montgomery was an abrasive, waspish man, and its true, he wasn’t popular amongst his peers. But nice people don’t successfully prosecute wars and contrary to some popular belief, he was well liked by the men under his command. The 7th Armd Bde under Montogomery achieved in ‘hours’ what several of his predecessors had failed to achieve in over a year.
It was well known in advance that the breakthrough at El Alamein would be an attritional and bloody fight. So it proved to be, but it achieved complete success. I can think of plenty of individual battles or operations in WWII where the Americans fed literally thousands of their troops into the grinder for very little immediate gain in order to achieve a strategic victory, and its a well known fact that Patton was a Sociopath.
Market Garden was a either a complete failure or partial success, depending on how you look at it, but whatever way it is viewed, it was Montgomery’s lowest ebb. However, to say he distanced himself from it and blamed others for it is disengenuous. The largest causal failure of the operation was the lack of heed (willfully or otherwise) paid to the enemy’s… ‘disposition’ shall we say, something Montogomery’s commanders sheltered him from to a large extent.
The use of intelligence gained from intercepting Enigma codes was far more subtle a problem than the simplistic accusations levelled at allied commanders as to how it was used.
Its very difficult to use that intelligence without it being entirely obvious to the enemy that you have broken their cyphers.
A far too ignored fact…
I don’t believe it is an ignored fact at al. It is well known that covert ops and movements where no explanation could be giving as to how the Allies knew could not be acted on. Many times operations were left to unfold without intervention because it wouldn’t have made sense for it to be prepared for.
When such intelligence was used one of three standards were required.
1- There was a plan/reason in place as to how the Allies knew.
2- It could be perceived as intelligence gained in other ways such as radio intercept.
3- It was reasonable for the Allies to expect such an operation from the opponent.
The third is were Montgomery comes in. Almost immediately after arriving in North Afrika the code breakers informed him of Rommels attack at Alam Halfa Ridge wich he then fortified and prepared the RAF for. This lead to the first German major defeat in the theatre. As we know after this was the battle of El Alamein. Were there was also the advantage of the German supplies being finally successfully cut of along with the new Shermans landing.
In late February 1943 after being reinforced Rommel (now inside Tunisa) decided to attack but once again the code breakers infored the Allies and they were perfectly prepared for it.
In open warfare such as the desert there was no hesitation in using this intelligence. Absolutely no one is accusing Allied commanders of anything fictional but there is nothing wrong in declaring were there was advantages.
Interesting post, with which i agree largely with.
We should not forget that Rommel also had his sources both in the field and in Cairo (I think it was Cairo) where some hapless American Staff Officer kept sending messages back to the states (repeatedly) using an outdated and compromised cypher.
N.B. The field listening stations where particularly effective due to very poor radio discipline within the 8th Army at the time. In some cases, the German command was getting complete transcripts before the intended recipients.
When these sources were cut-off to Rommel, he ceased to be the supernatural being he had once been percieved to be.
Oh yes, all true. Another rather funny tid bit regarding intercepts is the head ache Rommel actually caused by taking initiatives. When ordered to for example to halt (same problem Guderian had) he refused an attacked but the code breakers only recieved the command so then asumed there will be no attack. Hence not being prepared. 
“Montgomery achieved in “hours” what several of his predecessors had failed to achieve in over a year” is also slightly disingenuous as his predecessors did not receive the re-inforcements Montgomery was receiving (the new American M-4’s), and even then, he was being constantly prodded by superiors to “get on with it”!
Not only disingenuous, but also totally inaccurate with regard to the facts and historical record.
The Allies didn’t invade NWE until 6 June 1944. Operation Market-Garden didn’t start until 17 September 1944, just over 3 months later - not “over a year.” By the time of Market-Garden, Montgomery’s Allied peers had captured the entire Briteny coast of France and liberated Paris (25 August 1944) while Montgomery was only just getting around to the job he’d had since D-day, liberating Calais and liberating the northeastern channel ports.
Montgomery’s greatest success was (surprise to him) the capture of Antwerp on 3 September 1944 and it was also his greatest operational failure. He failed to exploit the early capture of Antwerp by immediately seizing the sea passages (which at the time were essentially undefended) that were necessary to enable the port to be used. Antwerp was captured on 3 September 1944, but it was only able to be put into use months later, 28 November 1944 after a great deal of combat and sacrifice by mostly Canadian forces. In the meantime, the entire Allied operation in NWE ground to a halt because of the lack of supplies. The delay with totally liberating and opening up Antwerp also allowed the Germans to consolidate their defenses along the channel coast south of Rotterdam making the campaign to open up the Scheldt estuary necessary. Al of this was entirely on Montgomery’s shoulders.
Not only was Market-Garden an ineffectual waste of Allied resources, but Montgomery’s inability to see past it and shift his own shortsighted thinking to recognize and then pursue the strategic boon that had fallen into his lap (the liberation of Antwerp and the German defenseless posture along the Scheld estuary leading to it) shows that Montgomery was a mediocre plodder when it came to generalship.
Could the war in NWE been appreciably shortened had Montgomery exploited the capture of Antwerp in September 1944 rather than waste time and resources on a dead-end Operation Market-Garden is debatable, but what’s not debatable is that it was Montgomery who missed the greater opportunity in order to pursue his own Market-Garden hobbyhorse. He lacked the vision to see that he could have quickly modified his Market-Garden plan to seize and clear the border area between Belgium and the Netherlands by shifting his objective from Arnhem to a westward axis from Eindhoven to Tilberg, Breda, Roosendaal, Bergen op Zoom. In doing so, he could have had the port of Antwerp open and running by the end of September giving the Allies two full months of good to fair campaigning weather still left in 1944. Who knows how things might have turned out if he had?
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The NTC rotations were quite interesting to participate in during that era. The basic scenarios were written around engaging the Soviets, although I personally thought that doing so in the desert with heavy forces outside those assigned to the RDF was highly unlikely. But participating in the “defend in sector” or “defend (die) in place” scenarios was quite eye opening and thought provoking. Watching the lead elements of OPFORs Motor Rifle Regiment roll at you in battle array was a sight to see! NBC was a standard part of the events, with constant gas attacks and a simulated nuke here and there thrown in for good measure. In hindsight, all I can say is Thank God that it never came to be for real.
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it really boils down to two egos wanting to be the first person in Berlin. Patton probably couldn’t have gotten into Berlin before Christmas due to logistics alone, and I seriously doubt Montgomery would either.
I might add that there was some seriously poor planning back in England with all groups. Yet I (and others) felt the failure was really the bottle neck on the road leading to Arnhem. You set a Jagedpanther up on high ground and literally control that road. The road was narrow and with no way to get off it to engage the enemy. They knew this before the boarded the airplanes, but chose to ignor it.
What defeated Romel was simply the lack of logistics and Allied control of the shipping lanes.
gary
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If the success of the U.S. Army in Europe was supposed to be forged at NTC, I never did understand the use of the desert environment. I assumed it was just a place with an existing garrison and no one cared what happened in this massive expanse of wasteland. I didn’t realize that 1980’s NTC scenarios involved tactical nukes. I’m guessing that involved an OC with a god gun just killing a whole formation, or the whole BDE TOC. That’s wild.
I never went to NTC on active duty. I went in the spring of 2021 and had a small team supporting a mechanized battalion. At the end of the first day the battalion trains passed through the whale gap heading to an assembly area several klicks away from John Wayne pass. It was twilight and there were whoopie lights blinking as far as the eye could see. I told my team to replace the whoopie lights with thick black columns of smoke in their mind. And to imagine a pile of ash inside every vehicle marked with that smoke, and then to imagine bodies scattered around every track. That’s war, and a single attack across that terrain would have wiped out an entire brigade. And then you go on and do that repeatedly for the next ten days.