It was mostly to have a large maneuver box and I think work on logistics on getting people and equipment there.
When I was there there were no nuke training but plenty of chemical training.
Exactly! Over 1,000 square miles of open terrain where tanks could blast each other with no complaints. I did two rotations out there. You do not really understand what mechanized power is until your entire field of view is filled with advancing tanks and assorted vehicles, especially when its the other sides vehicles!
They didn’t do a nuke attack when I was there, but they did one at Hohenfels once, unfortunately the nuke simulator didn’t work, too bad! The attack was far enough away that it didn’t kill us, but we had to deal with the contamination and stuff.
Ken
RTFQ.
Montgomery achieved in hours what predecessors had failed to achieve in over a year in North Africa, not NWE.
The Americans do like to use Market Garden and an apparently slow expansion of the D-Day bridgeheads as a stick to beat Montgomery and Co with don’t they, it seems to have become something of a fascination to them. Clearly being disingenuous and also totally inaccurate with regard to the facts and historical record isn’t a unique malaise.
As I quite clearly stated, Market Garden can either be viewed as a complete failure, or a partial succes, depending on your point of view. It is easy to disect it with the benefit of hindsight. A more objective view is available, but, its not like Americans to take a parochial view is it eh? I mean, for example, when the Americans did enter the North African theatre, the British watched on disbelief as the debacle at Kasserene Pass unfolded using disasterous tactics that the British had (partly) used two years before and quickly discarded.
But, if it is possible to look objectively at the wider picture you paint, many Americans more often than not willfully ignore that by the time the Americans turned up to the war, Britain had been fighting it, at times on its own, for two years. In comparison, the American forces were vast, fresh and had had practically no casualties in comparison.
Later, the Americans proved time and again that they would, if necessary, sacrifice large numbers of men in order to achieve quick victories, but Britain and Montogomery simply could not afford the numbers of casualties it would have taken (for example, the British & Empire troops were losing 7000 men a week in the Bocage).
This was one of Montogomery’s concerns and perhaps one of his drawbacks. He was a cautious, pacing man who simply didn’t have the will to commit large numbers of troops and to take the casualties that the American commanders could afford if necessary, and perhaps why that the one time he did strike while the iron was hot, it didn’t work out too well. He certainly wasn’t the inept leader that some like to believe he was.
But none of the Allies can claim to have had flawless commanders, apparently.
None of the Allied leaders was perfect. Patton was (as pointed out) a sociopath - but he was also a damned competent leader who was absolutely in his element fighting a war. The US defeat at Kasserine was the result of green men and green officers - but it was Rommel himself who noted that the Americans learned from their mistakes very quickly.
As to Britain fighting for years prior, Khouli is absolutely correct. Until Pearl Harbor, the US did not possess the political will to go to war like they did a few decades earlier. But at least we were supplying the Brits and the Sovs and the Arsenal of Democracy was up and running when we did go to fight.
Ah, well… My mistake. I assumed that you were defending Montgomery’s leadership and planning of Operation Market-Garden which was being discussed at the time.
The thread was discussing Market-Garden (which I brought up only) as an illustration of the results of planning a major armor attack while ignoring the generally understood principles for the effective use of tanks. In short, modern warfare is a matter of combined arms operations and logistics. Market-Garden is an example of a significant failure of an armored attack that has enough similarities to the failures of the Russians in the Ukraine to make a valid comparison with (particularly the early single axis of Russian attack south towards Kiev). The example was made merely to point out that such failures are not signs that tanks and AFVs are obsolete in modern warfare but rather that proper planning and employment is always the key.
Montgomery did, indeed, eventually succeed in North Africa, in his earliest campaign, the Second Battle of El Alamein. However, I would observe that Montgomery had nearly 3 months to plan and prepare for that operation, from 13 AUG 42 (when he was appointed commander of 8th Army) until 23 OCT 42 (when 2nd El Alamein started). Clearly this time and those preparations were necessary, and I don’t note this as any sort of criticism of Montgomery. Rather, this deliberate and detailed planning and preparation for a major armored attack supports my original point about the keys to successfully using armor.
However, this slow, deliberate and careful planning cycle shows Montgomery at his best - planning his fight and then fighting his plan. When one considers the care and detail with which Montgomery used in preparing for 2nd El Alamein, in particular his development of mass and the capacity to sustain, his poor plan for Market-Garden is all the more surprising since these are the areas in which it failed. Since he obviously understood and was capable of integrating these principles into his operations, the failure of Market-Garden planning should be sought in some other aspect of his character and temperament.
My criticism of Montgomery is that when confronted by unexpected situations (like the German defense of Caen) or opportunities (like the surprise capture of Antwerp), he was much less successful, demonstrating time and time again that he lacked a degree of vision, initiative and willingness to adjust to those events and modify his plans accordingly. In short, he was stubborn and inflexible. These can be advantages in some situations, but the best leaders and generals are also able to see and recognize unexpected opportunities while also having the mental agility to take advantage of them.
It is certainly true that British manpower resources were exceptionally thin by the time of the invasion into NWE, and a degree of prudence was of course called for. Offsetting this shortage of manpower, though, was the assignment to the 21st Army Group a suitably sized portion of the theater of operations and, when necessary, its augmentation with US forces (ex. the 2 US airborne divisions for Market-Garden).
My point, however, has been, and still remains, that in NWE Montgomery lost sight of the greater strategy, and his inflexible nature prevented him from recognizing and then exploiting the obvious (even then) opportunity that Antwerp presented.
With regard to economizing and husbanding his forces, Montgomery could have achieved a major strategic success using only the forces he had already at hand for Market-Garden, doing so from the general staging areas he already had ready, by simply adjusting his Market-Garden plan and objectives. Had he done so, he would have faced a much weaker and unprepared enemy (in the areas of the Scheldt west of his Market-Garden axis of advance) while also being able to take advantage of multiple axis of advance and multiple supporting lines of communication and supply to support that attack (both being fundamental flaws in the Market-Garden plan). The airborne forces could have been dropped on new objectives or the entirety of the Market part of the plan could have been cancelled with the airborne infantry simply airlanded on the continent and used to hold the terrain in conjunction with the armored attack.
If anything, such a change would likely have preserved large numbers of troops and other resources that were lost in Market-Garden (as it was executed).
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OK! Here’s my take on Monty, and take it or leave it. He always felt he should have been the top dog in Europe, and not Ike. Monty’s main critic was he moved slow and was somewhat cautious in his actions. Good or bad I just won’t say. He did get his work done, but on a somewhat slower pace. Was Ike a great General? Honestly I think he was pretty good but not great. (more on this later) With but two examples, I will always say Monty took care of his men. I respect that, and know how to deal with inflated egos (everywhere in WWII). I kinda think Omar Bradley might have been better that these two on an ego trip, and I’m sure the Common Wealth had a couple good leaders as well.
Sooner or later his name has to come up, so I’ll say it. Patton! I used to think that man could walk on water, but I don’t think so now days. Patton made his “bones” on the back of his troops (as did Monty). The difference between the two was that Patton rode his men like a borrowed mule, but as time passed the developed a bond. He too had an inflated ego, but he got the job done at a light speed pace. Hard as hell on his kids, but sure made him look good to the arm chair general staff. We often hear how he saved the day in the battle of the bulge. Truth be known he got there about a half day late. Still an epic move is the worst weather, and his kids did it without a whimper. Patton and Erwin Rommel came out of the same mold. Lightening fast tactics that used armor as a spear. Rommel also made his bones on the backs of his men. Romel and Patton constantly led from the front of the spear. By the way I have always felt Mark Clark to have been unfit for command.
This group of Generals have always reminded me of the American war between the states in leadership.
Grant was hard charging and made his bones on the backs of his men. Stone Wall Jackson made quick and deadly moves that usually caught his enemy with their pants down. Probably one of the greatest generals we’ve ever seen. Lee was a pro at getting the most with the least. His ideas are still studied world wide. Phil Sheridan is really good, and I think he might have been better than Grant. Sherman was similar to Patton, but with out the inflated ego. Monty falls in with McClellan. Joe Johnston may have been the best of the lot, and got the job done the right way. Interesting is the fact that all these generals were pretty good friends before that war, and remained that way till their deaths .
In my book the two best Generals were from the 101st and 82nd Airborne in WWII.
gary
Good morning Gary,
Some interesting and valid observations. Funnily enough, I was going to bring Mark Clark into the foray - his dash for Rome was irresponsible.
But, also, your take on Civil War leaders.
Currently, i’m watching the superb Ken Burns documentary ‘The Civil War’ on PBS. Ken Burns’s documentaries I find to be superb.
When Civil War students rate the top generals of the war, Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan can usually be found at opposite ends of the rankings. Though he has had some detractors, Lee is commonly found among the war’s best and, though he has had some proponents, McClellan’s name can usually be located towards the bottom of these lists. But Lee, it is said, rated McLellan highly.
I have to say that based on the documentary, i’d say McLellan was worse than Montogomery. McClellan had the opportunity to finish the war had he moved quicker at (I think it was) Antietam, amongst other places. Montogomery at least had an excuse for not moving quicker, McClellan just sat on his arse waiting.
Fascinating stuff.
I’ll not disagree with any of your post. McClellan was competent, but also useless. Bragg was another. Yet we also must look at these Generals to see where they came from. Some were thrown into the fire like a fish out of water, and some were born leaders. Johnston died in battle (bled out from a leg wound), but was as solid as R.E.Lee and natural born leader. I honestly think he might have been better than Lee, had he survived. You never hear about A.P. Hill, but he was solid as a rock. Yet he like Lee suffered from the same disease. Lack of logistics!
I’ve seen Burns series, and it’s OK, but not earth shaking. I thought Foote’s series to be far better, and more accurate. If your really interested in that conflict, then look for Bruce Caton’s books. They are old enough, that he got to speak with the veterans from both sides. The war was won and lost via logistics, and man power.
One must think of the year 1860 in the United States. The next previous war was the Mexican War in the 1840’s. Many of the southern generals came out of that war as officers and lower grade field officers. Leadership wise both side were pretty much unprepared. For the north, the younger generals were the hatchet, while the southern generals were nonexistent. A lot of it reminds me of the Ukraine. In the end it is pure logistics once again
gary
Shelby Foote contributes a lot to Burns’s documentary, I also find his knowledge fascinating. I personally found Burns’s documentary very interesting and hardly superficial at well over 10 hours in duration total. I also recently watched his documentary ‘Vietnam’, which i also found to be incredibly interesting and I learnt a lot from it.
I thought his Vietnam thing to be ill informed and border line fiction. His base ball series was pretty good.
The thing about Foote that probably got under the skin of the revisionist history bunch was his thoughts on the values of the folks involved. I still think he could have gone deeper, but will give him credit where credit is due. He made some statements that liked to put people in orbit, but a little research told you he was spot on. I do wish he had gone into the political events taking place in the back ground. One thing Foote simply hinted about, but never went into serious detail was why the South rose up against the North. Plus he sorta left out the aftermath. I guess there were time restraints involved or maybe just edited out. I do recommend his books, but still think Caton’s are better.
The war between the states never really interested me like it does others. Yet it was a trying time in U.S. history. I’m more interested in the late 18th century and maybe the “wild west.”
gary
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